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Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle  
to Practice 
Deborah L. Rhode* 
“Equal justice under law” is what America proclaims on its 
courthouse doors. What goes on inside them, however, looks entirely 
different. It is a shameful irony that our nation, which has the world’s 
greatest concentration of lawyers, has one of the least adequate 
systems for legal assistance. It is even more shameful that these 
inadequacies attract so little concern.  
The facts speak for themselves. An estimated four-fifths of the 
legal needs of the poor, and the needs of two- to three-fifths of 
middle-income individuals, remain unmet.1 Only one lawyer is 
available to serve approximately 9,000 low-income persons, 
compared with one for every 240 middle- and upper-income 
 
 * Deborah L. Rhode is Professor of Law and Director of the Keck Center on Legal 
Ethics and the Legal Profession, Stanford University. 
 1. For an earlier and more extended discussion of the issues presented in this paper, see 
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001). For unmet needs of 
the poor, see LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-
INCOME AMERICANS, A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000); Alan W. Houseman, Civil 
Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 369, 402 (1998); LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT, FUNDING CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR 
THE POOR: REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE 5 (1999); David C. Levin, Justice for the Forgotten 
and Despised, 6 TOURO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999); Access to Justice Development Campaign 2000: 
The Case for Support, 79 MICH. B.J. 370 (2000); FLORIDA BAR, ACCESS TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM (1999); OR. STATE BAR REPORT, THE STATE OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN OREGON 
(2000); Robert J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal Services to the Poor in the United States with Other 
Western Countries: Some Preliminary Lessons, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 223, 224 
(1994). For middle income consumers, see ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, 
Agenda for Access: The American People and Civil Justice (1996); ABA Consortium on Legal 
Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans (1994); Roy W. 
Reese and Carolyn A. Elred, American Bar Association, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and 
Moderate Income Households: Summary of Findings for the Comprehensive Legal Needs 
Study (1994); see also ACCESS TO JUSTICE WORKING GROUP, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: REPORT 
TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 4-6 (1996) [hereinafter “AND JUSTICE FOR ALL”] 
(estimating that three-quarters of the needs of poor Californians are unmet). 
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Americans.2 Over the last two decades, national spending on legal 
assistance has been cut by a third, and increasing restrictions have 
been placed on the cases and clients that government-funded 
programs can accept.3 Entire categories of the “unworthy poor” have 
been denied assistance.4 Courts have largely acquiesced in these 
denials, as well as in ludicrously limited fees for court-appointed 
lawyers.5 The legal doctrine governing the effective assistance of 
counsel and the access to non-lawyer services is a conceptual 
embarrassment. The price is paid in untold misery—in loss of liberty, 
livelihood, and occasionally even life. Yet, neither the public nor the 
profession has been moved to respond in any significant fashion. 
This essay chronicles our abandoned aspirations. It begins with a 
candid confrontation of our failures: our unwillingness to take equal 
justice seriously at a theoretical, political, doctrinal, or professional 
level. It concludes with a challenge to do better. 
I. FAILURES OF THEORY 
In principle, “equal justice under law” is difficult to oppose. In 
practice, however, it begins to unravel at several key points, 
beginning with what we mean by “justice.” In most discussions, 
“equal justice” implies an equal access to the justice system.6 The 
underlying assumption is that social justice is available through 
procedural justice. Yet, as is frequently noted, equal access to the 
justice system is a dubious proposition.7 Those who receive their 
“day in court” do not always feel that “justice has been done,” and 
with reason. Money often matters more than merits, in all the ways 
that Marc Galanter described in his classic article on “Why the 
 
 2. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers, CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
 3. See infra notes 30 and 33. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra notes 30, 33, 40, and 41.  
 6. See Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid Is Abolished, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 
375, 386 (1999); Stephen Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 269, 272 
(1999); Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor’s Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 
651, 655 (1981).  
 7. DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
AND REGULATION 148 (2002). 
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‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead.”8 Substantive rights and procedural 
obstacles can be skewed, and given the post-judgment power 
relations among the parties, even those who win in court can lose in 
life.  
These difficulties are seldom acknowledged in bar discussions of 
access to justice, which assume that more access is better, and the 
trick is how to best achieve it. Even from a purely procedural 
standpoint, however, these discussions leave a host of conceptual 
complexities unaddressed. Does meaningful access to law also 
require access to lawyers, and if so, how much is enough? For what, 
from whom, and for whom is access to justice required? Should 
government support go only to the officially poor, or to all those who 
cannot realistically afford lawyers? Could well-trained non-lawyers 
effectively meet some of the public’s unmet legal needs? How much 
claiming and blaming is our society prepared to subsidize? How do 
legal needs compare with other claims on our collective resources? 
Most importantly, who should decide the answers? 
The complexities are compounded if we think seriously about 
what would truly make justice “equal.” Equal to what or to whom? 
How realistically do we deal with disparities in incentives, resources, 
and legal ability? Would we not only need massive public 
expenditures, but also restriction of private expenditures? As R.H. 
Tawney once noted about equal opportunity, one wonders what 
would alarm proponents most—“the denial of the principle or the 
attempt to apply it.”9 If cost were no constraint, what would prevent 
people from excessively resorting to expensive procedural processes. 
As Professor Marc Galanter puts the relevant question—presumably 
rhetorically—“Is the utopia of access to justice a condition in which 
all disputes are fully adjudicated?”10  
Part of the reason that we are reluctant to confront these issues 
involves the scale of additional subsidies that would be necessary to 
provide minimal, let alone equal, access. Unlike most other 
 
 8. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead?: Speculation on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  
 9. R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 103 (l964). 
 10. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE 
STATE 147, 150 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981) (emphasis added). 
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industrialized nations, the United States recognizes no right to legal 
assistance for civil matters. Courts have exercised their discretion to 
appoint counsel in only a narrow category of cases. Legislative 
budgets have been equally minimal. The federal government, which 
provides about two-thirds of the funding for civil legal aid, now 
spends only about $300 million for such assistance.11 This works out 
to roughly eight dollars per year for those officially classified as poor. 
Recent estimates suggest that well over ten times that amount—on 
the order of three to four billion dollars—would be required to meet 
the civil legal needs of low-income Americans.12 Such estimates 
substantially understate the magnitude of expenditures that would be 
necessary to guarantee minimal access, because such estimates do not 
include the unmet needs of middle-income Americans, who are now 
priced out of the legal process. Nor do they include collective 
concerns such as environmental risks or community economic 
development. Moreover, the ultimate legal cost of representation 
would not only include the price of legal assistance, but also of 
opposing parties’ legal costs, as well as any remedies that legal 
proceedings could secure. If Americans could assert all of their 
entitlements under both common law and government programs, the 
financial implications would be dramatic.13 In the current political 
climate, the prospects for such a reform agenda are not promising, to 
say the least.  
Nor do these access to justice projections take into account the 
cost of providing truly adequate assistance in both the criminal cases 
and the limited number of civil proceedings where indigents are 
already entitled to court-appointed counsel. Hourly rates and 
statutory caps on the compensation for private lawyers are set at 
ludicrously unrealistic levels. Rates per hour can drop below fifteen 
dollars an hour, and ceilings of $1,000 are common for felony cases. 
In some states, teenagers who sell soda on the beaches earn more 
than court-appointed lawyers.14 For most of these lawyers, excessive 
 
 11. See Rhode, supra note 1; Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The 
Problem of Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573 (2002). 
 12. And Justice for All, supra note 1, at 40 (putting the figure at $3.6 billion); Hazard, 
supra note 6, at 380 (estimating between four and five billion dollars).  
 13. RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 7, at 150. 
 14. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 204 (1999). 
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caseloads are a way of life, and thorough preparation is a quick route 
to financial ruin.15 As a consequence, some lawyers have spent less 
time preparing for a felony trial than the average American spends 
showering before work.16 Analogous constraints arise in public 
defender offices that generally operate with crushing caseloads, 
sometimes up to 500 felony matters at a time. Under these 
circumstances adequate preparation is impossible for the vast 
majority of cases.17 Most court-appointed counsel also lack sufficient 
resources to hire the experts and investigators who may be essential 
to an adequate defense.18 Defendants who receive an income just 
above the poverty line, and hire their own attorneys, do not 
necessarily fare better. Even in capital cases, many individuals end 
up—as death penalty expert Stephen Bright once put it—with 
counsel who have “never tried a case before and never should 
again.”19 
Our pretensions to equal justice mesh poorly with these financial 
realities. Yet we have failed to devise appropriate limiting principles, 
both at the theoretical level and at the political level.  
 
 15. Excessive caseloads are common among private practitioners who specialize in court-
appointed cases. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2001); Jane Fritsche & David Rohde, Caseloads Push System to Breaking Point, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at A1 (describing a lawyer with 1600 cases in a single year, and 
thirteen others who exceeded Legal Aid Society limits). 
 16. Stephen B. Bright, Sleeping on the Job, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at A26. 
 17. See prepared statement of Stephen B. Bright, Before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary Federal News Service, June 27, 2001 (describing a court-appointed lawyer earning 
only $11.84 per hour for a capital trial); Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for 
Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Bob Sablatura, Study 
Confirms Money Counts in County Courts: Those Using Appointed Lawyers Twice as Likely to 
Serve Time, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 1999, at 1. 
 18. Catherine Greene Burnette et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective 
Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595, 
597, 622 (2001); No Fair Trial Unless You Can Buy One, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Sept. 9, 2001, 
at 8. 
 19. Stephen B. Bright, Keep the Dream Alive, (unpublished speech, 1999, available at 
http://schr.org/reports/docs/commerce.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2003)). 
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II. FAILURES OF POLICY AND POLITICS 
Much of the problem in securing a broader access to justice stems 
from the public’s failure to recognize that there is, in fact, a problem. 
A wide gap persists between popular perceptions and daily realities 
concerning access to services. Most Americans are convinced that the 
legal system coddles criminals, a view reinforced by news and 
entertainment media. In the courtrooms that the public sees, lawyers 
such as those representing O.J. Simpson leave no stone unturned. But 
these lawyers are charging by the stone, while most defense counsel 
cannot. It matters. Recent studies find that between half and four-
fifths of counsel entered guilty pleas without interviewing any 
prosecution witnesses.20  
The inadequacy of representation is lost on many legislators, 
whose electorate is more interested in getting tough on criminals than 
in subsidizing their defense. For example, Georgia’s annual budget 
for indigent criminal defense is less than one-fifth of its budget for 
prosecutors, and one-half of the amount allocated to improve just one 
interstate highway intersection.21 The chair of a Missouri 
appropriations committee expressed a common attitude with 
uncommon candor by publicly announcing that he “did not care 
whether indigent criminal defendants received representation.”22 
Although recent exonerations of wrongfully convicted defendants 
through DNA evidence has somewhat increased the public’s concern 
about the adequacy of criminal defense, budget priorities have rarely 
changed in response.23  
Ironically enough, some politicians view overturned convictions 
 
 20. Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in 
Criminal Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 51, 56 (1997). Mike 
McConville & Chester Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social Disciplinary Model of Criminal 
Justice, 42 SOC. PROB. 216 (1995).  
 21. State Should Pay for Indigent Defense, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 31, 2001, at A11; 
Presumed Innocent Doesn’t Apply to All, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 5, 2001, at F8. 
 22. Ron Ostroff, Missouri Remains Unable To Pay Indigents’ Counsel; Pro Bono Revolt 
Grows, NAT’L. L.J., May 11, l981, at 2.  
 23. The Innocence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. §§ 201-203 (2000), 
would provide significant incentives for states to meet minimal standards for representing 
indigent defendants in capital cases and would provide federal funding for efforts by public 
agencies and private nonprofit organizations to improve such representation. 
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as a vindication of the system. President George W. Bush, while 
serving as the Governor of Texas, jokingly dismissed the significance 
of a federal court decision overturning the conviction of a death-row 
defendant whose lawyer had slept during his trial. According to Bush, 
this decision’s reversal of two state court rulings proved that the 
“system works.”24 Similar comments are often made about cases in 
which recently discovered DNA evidence exposed wrongful 
convictions. Yet, when demonstrably innocent defendants are 
incarcerated for decades before release, and thousands of other 
prisoners lack any representation for potentially valid claims, is this 
evidence of a system working?25 
Although legal aid for civil cases has a somewhat greater political 
appeal, Americans are equally misinformed about what adequate aid 
would require. The vast majority of the public favors legal 
representation for the poor. However, most would rather see it come 
from volunteer attorneys than from government subsidies, and forty-
percent want to support only advice, not litigation.26 For many 
claims, such as those involving challenges to welfare legislation or 
prison conditions, one Denver legal aid attorney aptly noted that 
“[t]he only thing less popular than a poor person is a poor person 
with a lawyer.”27 
Not only are Americans ambivalent about ensuring legal 
assistance, they are ill-informed about the assistance that is currently 
available. Almost four-fifths of Americans incorrectly believe that 
the poor are now entitled to legal aid in civil cases, and only a third 
thinks that they would have a very difficult time obtaining 
assistance.28 Such perceptions are wildly out of touch with reality. 
 
 24. Bright, supra note 16. 
 25. Calvin Burdine was convicted in 1986; the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of his 
conviction in 2002. See also Robert Sherrill, Death Trip: The American Way of Execution, THE 
NATION, Jan. 8, 2001, at 20 (discussing the case of Ricardo Guerra who spent fourteen years on 
death row before being exonerated). 
 26. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 1791; Belden, et al., National Survey on 
Civil Legal Aid (unpublished report, Apr. 2000, on file with the WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY). 
 27. Robert Pear, As Welfare Overhaul Looms, Legal Aid for Poor Dwindles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 1995, at A1 (quoting Jonathan D. Asher). For legislative restrictions on federally 
funded legal aid, see infra.  
 
 28. Belden, supra note 26; Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where the United 
States Stands Two Decades Later, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199 (1994). Washington University Open Scholarship
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Legal services can handle less than a fifth of the needs of eligible 
clients. Often, they are only able to offer brief advice, and not the full 
range of assistance that is necessary.29 Waitlists of two years for non-
emergencies are common. Entire categories of the “unworthy poor” 
are excluded from federal support, such as prisoners, undocumented 
immigrants, or individuals with claims involving abortions, gay and 
lesbian rights, or challenges to welfare legislation.30 
Part of the problem is that few individuals are aware of what 
passes for justice among the “have-nots,” and their perceptions are 
often skewed by idealized portrayals in civics classes, popular media, 
and right wing political rhetoric. The federal legal services budget 
has been a particularly inviting target, and the most effective state 
and local programs have attracted similar opposition.31 According to 
critics’ accounts, legal services lawyers have pursued radical social 
agendas, and obtained “cushy” amenities for convicted felons. 
Further, they have worsened the plight of the poor by encouraging 
welfare dependency, or by bankrupting those who hire low income 
workers.32 Such claims have eroded political support and have 
encouraged restrictions on federal funding. As a consequence, most 
legal aid organizations may not bring class action lawsuits or assist 
community organizing activities that might address the structural 
sources of poverty-related legal needs.33  
 
 29.  Hearing on the Legal Services Corporation Before the Subcommittee on Commercial 
and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Committee (1999) (statement of John 
Pickering). 
 30. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321; 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610-1642.  
 31. See Bruce Rushton, Legislature 95: Legal Aid Agencies Face Legislative Ax: 
Lawmakers Object to Help for Migrant Workers, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr. 15, 1995, 
at B1; Anne Windishar, Poor Need Legal Help Now More Than Ever, SPOKESMAN REV. 
(Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 6, 1995, at A12. Law school clinics also face similar opposition. See 
Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 
74 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
 32. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 1793-94. 
 33. 45 C.F.R. 1612, 1677. For a discussion on the need for such legal services activities 
see Steve Bachmann, Access to Justice As Access to Organizing, 4 U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. 
CHALLENGES 1 (2002); Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 1795; BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A 
LAWYER 9-10 (2000). 
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III. FAILURES OF THE JUDICIARY 
Such restrictions on legal assistance have persisted because of 
judicial as well as public indifference. In 1956, in Griffin v. Illinois, 
the Supreme Court observed that “[t]here can be no equal justice 
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money 
he has.”34 Over the next half century, American courts have 
repeatedly witnessed the truth of that observation, and have 
repeatedly failed to address it. These failures have occurred along 
multiple dimensions. In civil cases, except in a few highly limited 
circumstances, courts have declined to require any legal assistance, 
let alone equal or adequate assistance. In the civil and criminal 
proceedings where courts have recognized a right to assistance, they 
have failed to insure that the representation meets acceptable 
standards. 
Reported decisions have declined to find ineffective assistance of 
counsel even where the attorney was drunk, on drugs, or parking his 
car during key parts of the prosecution’s case.35 Defendants have 
been executed despite their lawyers’ lack of any prior trial 
experience, their ignorance of all relevant death penalty precedents, 
or their failure to present any mitigating evidence.36 One systematic 
survey found that over ninety-nine percent of ineffective assistance 
claims were unsuccessful.37  
The extent of judicial tolerance is well illustrated by the 
jurisprudence that has developed to determine how much dozing is 
constitutionally permissible. As one judge famously put it, “the 
Constitution says that everyone is entitled to an attorney of their 
choice. But the Constitution does not say that the lawyer has to be 
 
 34. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
 35. DAVID I. COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 87 (1999); BRIGHT, supra note 19; Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137 
(1986); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1957-58 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth 
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 499-501 (1993). 
 36. See COLE, supra note 35, at 87; Bright, supra note 16, at A26; Green, supra note 35, 
at 499-501. 
 37. Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court 
Convictions, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 259-60 (1995).  
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awake.”38 Other courts have agreed, and some have employed a 
detailed three-step analysis: did counsel sleep for repeated and 
prolonged periods; was counsel actually unconscious; and were 
crucial defense interests at stake while counsel was asleep.39  
Not only have courts been reluctant to set aside convictions for an 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but they have been equally 
unwilling to address the financial and caseload pressures that produce 
it. Challenges to inadequate statutory fees for private attorneys, and 
excessive assignments for public defenders, have rarely been 
successful. Discipline for incompetent attorney performance is 
notoriously absent.40 Indeed, judges, who face crushing caseloads of 
their own, have often been reluctant to encourage effective advocacy 
because it would increase the number of lengthy trials and pretrial 
matters. Some courts will even withhold appointments from lawyers 
who provide such advocacy.41  
Finally, and most disturbingly, judges have failed to address the 
impact of their own rules and practices in obstructing access to 
justice. On issues such as procedural simplification, pro se assistance, 
and non-lawyer services, courts have too often been part of the 
problem, rather than the solution. In “poor people’s courts,” which 
 
 38. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996); Bob Herbert, Cheap Justice 
in America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at 15; Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, THE 
NATION, Apr. 7, 1997, at 27-29 (quoting Judge Doug Shaver). 
 39. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th 
Cir. 2001), Cockrell v. Burdine, cert. den. sub. nom. 122 S. Ct. 2347 (2002). The problem in 
relying on the trial record to determine if crucial interests were jeopardized should be obvious! 
Robert McGlasson, Burdine’s court-appointed lawyer, indicated one of the obvious shortfalls 
by asking, “[h]ow can you make the record if you’re asleep?” Jason Hoppin, Law on Sleepy 
Lawyers Could Use a Tucking In: Circuits Toss and Turn on Review Standard, S.F. RECORDER, 
June 6, 2002.  
 40. Frances A. McMorris, Giuliani’s Hard Line Breaks Strike at New York City Legal 
Services, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1994, at B11; FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n., 493 
U.S. 411 (1990) (finding that a boycott by District of Columbia defense attorneys who were 
seeking higher compensation constituted an antitrust violation). Dennis E. Curtis & Judith 
Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2002). For one of the 
few recent cases finding a threat of inadequate representation due to inadequate compensation, 
see New York County Lawyers Association, New York, No. 102987/00 (2002). 
 41. See Bright, supra note 17, at 6; Burnette, supra note 18, at 595, 597, 622, 641. Sara 
Rimer & Raymond Bonner, Texas Lawyer’s Death Row Record a Concern, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2000, at A1 (noting judges’ preference for lawyers who “moved cases quickly”); 
McConville & Mirsky, supra note 20; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979, 1990-92 (1992). 
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handle housing, bankruptcy, small claims, and family matters, parties 
without lawyers are less the exception than the rule.42 Yet these 
parties operate in systems that have been designed by and for 
lawyers, and courts have done far too little to make them accessible 
to the average claimant.  
Innovative projects and reform proposals are not in short supply. 
They include procedural simplification; standardized forms; 
educational materials; self-service centers with interactive kiosks for 
information and document preparation; and free in-person assistance 
from volunteer lawyers or court personnel.43 However, a majority of 
surveyed courts have no formal pro se assistance services. Many of 
the available services are unusable by those who need help most, 
such as uneducated litigants with limited computer competence and 
English language skills.44  
Judges vary considerably in their willingness to fill the gaps and 
to assist unrepresented parties. Some courts have been reluctant to 
intervene on the ground that such efforts will either compromise their 
 
 42. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990); Russell Engler, And Justice For 
All–Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and 
Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro 
Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 14 (1998) [hereinafter Goldschmidt, Litigants]; JONA 
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND 
GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998); Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants 
Without Lawyers, 28 FAM. L.Q. 407 (1994).  
 43. ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, RESPONDING TO THE 
NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT 12-13 (1994); FAMILY LAW SEC. 
COMM. ON THE PROBATE AND FAMILY CT., MASS. B. ASSOC., CHANGING THE CULTURE OF 
THE PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT 29 (1997) [hereinafter “CHANGING THE CULTURE”]; 
Goldschmidt, Litigants, supra note 42, at 29-34; Engler, supra note 42, at 2049; Roger C. 
Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 
(1994); Dianne Molvig, Growing Solutions to Unmet Legal Needs, 69-AUG. WIS. LAW. 10 
(1996).  
 44. Lillian C. Henry & Gillian N. Bush, California’s Family Law Facilitator and 
Arizona’s Self-Service Center: Success and Limitations of Two Systems Designed to Meet the 
Challenges of Legal Services, 34 (1999) (Stanford Law School, unpublished paper on file with 
author); see also Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and 
Client Power, 48 FLA. L. REV. 481 (1996) (only forty-four percent of surveyed participants in a 
pro se divorce assistance program had obtained a divorce); Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self 
Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 563 (1993) (finding that most pro se divorce litigants who were surveyed 
had some college education). Services are inadequate for non-English speaking criminal 
defendants as well. See No English Translates Into No Fairness, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Oct. 22, 
2001, at A12. 
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impartiality or encourage more individuals to proceed without 
representation.45 Even the most sympathetic judges have often been 
unwilling to push for reforms that will antagonize lawyers whose 
economic interests are threatened by pro se assistance and whose 
support is critical to judges’ own effectiveness, election campaigns, 
and advancement.46 
Similar considerations have worked against the efforts to broaden 
access through non-lawyer providers of legal services. Almost all 
scholarly experts and bar commissions that have systematically 
studied the issue have recommended an increase in opportunities for 
lay assistance.47 Almost all of the major judicial decisions have 
ignored those recommendations, which has resulted in prohibitions 
on the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyer competitors, 
which are sweeping in scope and unsupportable in practice.48 The 
dominant approach is to prohibit the lay provision of personalized 
legal services. Comparative research, however, finds that nonlawyer 
specialists are generally at least as qualified as lawyers to provide 
assistance on routine matters where legal needs are greatest.49 Such 
results should come as no surprise. Law schools do not generally 
teach, and bar exams do not test, the specialized information that 
 
 45. Engler, supra note 42, at 2012-15; CHANGING THE CULTURE, supra note 43, at 51; 
Goldschmidt, Litigants, supra note 42, at 19; Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 46. See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation—Who 
Should Control Lawyer Regulation: Courts, Legislature, or the Market? (2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
 47. For scholars’ views, see the sources cited in Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in 
Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism]; Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of 
Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990). For other experts, see 
COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NONLAWYER 
ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 1995); State Bar of California Commission on Legal Technician's 
Report (San Francisco: July 1990) [hereinafter California Commission]. 
 48. See supra note 46. 
 49. See Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 47; HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL 
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 193-203 (1998); JUDITH CITRON, THE 
CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU: FOR THE COMMUNITY, BY THE COMMUNITY (1989); Matthew A. 
Melone, Income Tax Practice and Certified Public Accountants: The Case for a Status Based 
Exemption From State Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 11 AKRON TAX J. 47 (1995); 
California Commission, supra note 47, at 41. See also Yegge, supra note 42, at 407, 418. In the 
one reported survey of consumer satisfaction, non-lawyers rated higher than lawyers. Rhode, 
Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 47, at 230-31.  
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those matters require. Although courts have justifiable concerns 
about unqualified or unethical lay assistance, these abuses are not the 
only targets of the unauthorized practice doctrine. Moreover, such 
problems could be addressed through more narrowly drawn 
prohibitions and licensing structures for nonlawyer providers.50 
A final area of judicial abdication involves pro bono service. 
Proposed requirements have come and gone, but mainly gone.51 State 
supreme courts have adopted only aspirational standards, coupled in a 
few jurisdictions with occasional court assignments or mandatory 
reporting systems.52 Yet, most lawyers have failed to meet these 
aspirational goals, and the performance of the profession as a whole 
remains at a shameful level.  
IV. FAILURES OF THE BAR  
Nowhere is the gap between rhetorical commitments and actual 
practices more appalling than on issues of public service. Bar ethical 
codes and commentary have long maintained that lawyers have an 
obligation to assist those who cannot afford counsel.53 Additionally, 
bar leaders have long waxed eloquent in describing the “quiet 
heroism” of the profession in discharging that responsibility.54  
Such claims suggest more about the profession’s capacity for self-
delusion than for self-sacrifice. Although accurate information is 
difficult to obtain, recent surveys indicate that most lawyers provide 
no significant pro bono assistance to the poor.55 In most states, fewer 
 
 50. For examples of such proposals, see Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 47, at 715; 
California Commission, supra note 47. 
 51. See Comm. on Pro Bono and Legal Servs., Proposal to the Chief Judge Judith Kaye 
for an Attorney Pro Bono Reporting Requirement, 52 N.Y.C. B. ASS’N. REC. 367 (1997); 
Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right 
Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 98-99 (1990). 
 52. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 1-3.1 and Rules of Judicial 
Admin. 2.065, 630 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1993).  
 53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
EC 2-25, 8-3. 
 54. Robert L. Haig, Lawyer-Bashing: Have We Earned It?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1993, at 2; 
Robert A. Stein, Leader of the Pro Bono Pack, 83 A.B.A. J. 108 (1997). See also Jerome J. 
Shestack, The Pro Bono Principle, 84 A.B.A. J. 8 (1998).  
 55. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1. See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN 
PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE (forthcoming 2003; on file with the author). 
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than a fifth of lawyers offer such services.56 The average pro bono 
contribution is under half an hour a week and half a dollar a day.57  
Participation by the profession’s most affluent members reflect a 
particularly dispiriting distance between the bar’s idealized image 
and its actual practices. Fewer than a fifth of the nation’s 100 most 
financially successful firms meet the ABA’s standard of providing 
fifty hours a year of pro bono service.58 Over the past decade, when 
these firms’ revenues grew by over fifty percent, their average pro 
bono hours decreased by a third. For many other employers, salary 
wars have pushed compensation levels to new heights, which has 
eroded, rather than expanded, support for pro bono programs.59 Even 
the most modest efforts to increase the profession’s public service 
commitments have been dismissed as forms of “latent fascism” and 
“economic slavery.”60 The vast majority of lawyers have rejected the 
notion that their special status entails special obligations.  
The bar has also fought for restraints on lay competition that help 
to price services out of reach for many consumers. Bar leaders have 
long insisted that such restrictions are motivated solely by concerns 
to protect the public, rather than the profession. Virtually no experts 
or other countries share that view.61 Most nations permit nonlawyers 
to provide advice on routine matters, and no evidence suggests that 
these lay specialists are inadequate.62 Problems of unqualified or 
 
 56. LSC Statistics: Private Attorney Involvement, All Programs, available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr_pai.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003); see Gary Spencer, Pro Bono 
Data Show Little Improvement, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1. 
 57. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1. 
 58. Aric Press, Eight Minutes, AM. LAW., July 2000, at 13. 
 59. Kate Ackley & Bryan Rund, Pro Bono: Casualty of Salary Wars?, LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2000, at 1, 18; Roger Parloff, Too Rich To Give, AM. LAW., Apr. 2000, at 15; Anthony 
Perez Cassino, Skyrocketing Pay and Public Service, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 2000, at 24. Mark 
Hansen, Trickle-away Economics?, 86 A.B.A. J. 20 (2000). 
 60. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives in Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 
610 (1985); Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyers’s Duty of Public Service: 
More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367, 391 n.97 (1994); Michael J. Mazzone, 
Mandatory Pro Bono: Slavery in Disguise, TEX. LAW., Oct. 22, 1990, at 22.  
 61. See Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 1806-07 
 62. Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: An Exploratory Essay, 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 29 (1985); CITRON, supra note 49; Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future 
Role of ‘Law Workers’: Rethinking the Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal 
Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 917 (2002); MICHAEL ZANDER, THE STATE OF JUSTICE 23 n.61 
(2001). 
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unethical services can be addressed through regulation, not 
prohibition. Yet the organized bar is moving in precisely the opposite 
direction. In its most recent action, the American Bar Association 
approved a resolution to increase the enforcement of unauthorized 
practice prohibitions, and some states are taking similar actions.63 
Unless and until the public demands a less restrictive licensing 
structure, unmet legal needs are likely to remain a persistent and 
pervasive problem. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE ASPIRATION: ADEQUATE ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
Any serious effort to address this problem must begin with more 
realistic aspirations. Equal justice is an implausible ideal; adequate 
access to justice is less poetic but more imaginable. Courts, bar 
associations, law schools, legal aid providers, and community 
organizations must work together to develop comprehensive, 
coordinated systems for the delivery of legal services. Such systems 
should seek both to reduce the need for expensive professional 
assistance, and to increase access to such assistance for those who 
cannot realistically afford it.  
Minimizing the need for professional assistance calls for strategies 
along several dimensions: increased simplification of the law; more 
self-help initiatives; better protections of unrepresented parties; 
greater access to non-lawyer providers; greater collaboration among 
professionals across multiple disciplines including law; and expanded 
opportunities for informal dispute resolution in accessible out-of-
court settings. Providing adequate assistance for those who are unable 
to afford it will require a greater commitment from courts, 
legislatures, and bar associations. Judges must do far more to ensure 
the competent performance of lawyers in criminal cases, and to 
ensure adequate access to lawyers in civil cases. The standards 
governing malpractice and effective assistance of counsel should also 
be strengthened. States should be required to allocate sufficient 
resources for indigent defense, and restrictions should be lifted from 
 
 63. Select Committee Report on the 2000 Midyear Meeting, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2000hous.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2003); Governor Davis 
Signs Bar-Backed Bill to Crack Down on UPL, CAL. B.J., Oct. 2002, at 1. 
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the causes and strategies that lawyers can pursue. Financial subsidies 
should come from a variety of sources that are likely to command 
greater political support than general tax funds. Examples of such 
financial subsidies include: a tax on legal services revenues; a 
surcharge on court costs for cases that exceed a certain amount; and a 
pro bono requirement for lawyers that could be satisfied by a 
reasonable amount of direct service or the financial equivalent.64  
It is a national disgrace that civil legal aid programs now reflect 
less than one percent of the nation’s legal expenditures. It is a 
professional disgrace that pro bono service occupies less than one 
percent of lawyers’ working hours. We can, and must, do more. Our 
greatest challenge lies in persuading the public and the profession to 
share this view. More education about what passes for justice among 
the “have-nots” should be a key priority. Law schools have a unique 
opportunity and a corresponding obligation to insure that access to 
justice becomes a professional priority. 
 
 64. See AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 1, at 49-50, 58-60; Talbot “Sandy” 
D’Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 25 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 631 
(1998).  
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